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DUE PROCESS
Connecticut State Constitution.
The court omitted its discussion of the plaintiffs' claims that
chapter 584 violates provisions of the New York State
Constitution including the free exercise of religion clause for
purposes of publication. The court concluded that PCAP was not
violative of the free exercise clause.
CIVIL COURT
NEW YORK COUNTY
55 Avenue C Housing Development
Fund Corporation v. Serrano256
(published January 23, 1991)
Tenant claimed that a privately-owned cooperative's involve-
ment with the state, constituted state action such that he was
guaranteed a due process right under the New York State257 and
Federal258 Constitutions to notice and cause of eviction before
such eviction could take place. The court held, under the state
constitution, that there was "meaningful State participation" with
the cooperative's activities so as to constitute state action and,
thus, to entitle the tenant to procedural due process of law. 259
The cooperative brought this proceeding to evict a tenant on the
ground that he was "holding over after termination of his
term. "260 The tenant moved to dismiss the action because he did
not receive notice for the cause of eviction.
Prior to becoming a cooperative, the building was owned and
managed by the City of New York. To assist the tenants in
forming a cooperative, the city funded the building's rehabilita-
tion, gave money to the tenants to purchase the building and
physical or mental disability.").
256. N.Y. L., Jan. 23, 1991, at 24 (Civ. Ct. New York County 1991).
257. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
258. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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granted tax exemptions. Subsequently, the tenants formed a co-
operative corporation pursuant to article XI of the Private
Housing Finance Law261 and section 402 of the state's Business
Corporation Law.2 62  Prior to becoming a cooperative
association, the group of tenants agreed with the city to provide
housing for low-income people and agreed not to sell the building
without approval from the city. 263 The cooperative asserted that
the city's involvement constituted "only passive control" and
therefore did not warrant state action. The cooperative claimed
that once a private cooperative assumed ownership of the
building, it was no longer subject to state action under the
Federal Due Process Clause.264
The court, however, observing that the state constitution's due
process clause provides "a more flexible standard than the one
found in the Fourteenth Amendment," concluded that there was
state action under the state constitutional provision. 265 Relying
upon the state action test announced by the New York Court of
Appeals in Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc. ,266 the court
found that "the City is sufficiently entwined with the activities"
of the cooperative so as to constitute state action. 267 According to
the Sharrock court, the following factors must be considered to
determine whether there is state action:
The source of authority for the private action; whether the State
is so entwined with the regulation of the private conduct as to
constitute State activity; whether there is meaningful State
participation in the activity; and whether there has been a dele-
gation of what has traditionally been a State function to a private
261. N.Y. PRiv. Hous. FiN. LAW §§ 500-508 (McKinney 1991).
262. N.Y. Bus. CoRp. LAW § 402 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1992).
263. 55 Ave. C, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 23, 1991, at 24.
264. Id. (citing Langevin v. Chenango, 447 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1971);
Reiner v. West Village Assocs., 600 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y.), aftd, 786
F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1985); Argo v. Hills, 425 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 578 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1978)).
265. Id. (citing Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 45 N.Y.2d 152, 379
N.E.2d 1169, 408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978)).








The court based its assessment on the fact that there was state
financial assistance, tax exemptions and state imposed restricted
use of the building. Based on this past and present state involve-
ment, the court concluded that the tenant was entitled to involm
his due process guarantees under the state constitution.
For private conduct to be actionable under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Federal Constitution, there must be significant
state involvement with such conduct. 269 Private conduct,
authorized by state law, is not always dispositive to a finding of
state action under the Federal Constitution. For example, in
Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,270 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that there was state action and proceeded to invalidate
a statute that gave a clerk of a court the power to grant a
prejudgment wage garnishment proceeding without notice or
hearing.271 On the other hand, in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v.
Brooks,272 the Court upheld a New York lien law that permitted
warehouse owners, who had a lien on goods stored under their
custody, the right to sell such goods subject to certain notice
requirements. 273 In Flagg, the Court found a "total absence of
overt official involvement," 274 and concluded that there was no
state action constituting a Fourteenth Amendment violation. 275
Confronted with a similar lien law, the New York Court of
Appeals observed that the state constitution's due process clause
"provides a basis to apply a more flexible State involvement re-
quirement than is currently being imposed by the Supreme Court
with respect to the Federal provision.",276 In Sharrock, the court
268. Id. at 158, 379 N.E.2d at 1172, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 42-43.
269. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 375 (1967).
270. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
271. Id. at 342.
272. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
273. Id. at 151-52 (citing N.Y. U.C.C. § 7-210 (McKinney 1964)).
274. Id. at 157.
275. Id. at 166.
276. Sharrock, 45 N.Y.2d at 160, .379 N.E.2d at 1174, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
44. In Sharrock, the court noted that under the state provision instances of
private discrimination were prohibited, whereas under the federal equivalent,
1992] 877
3
et al.: Due Process
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2020
TOURO LAW REVIEW
held that under the state constitution's due process clause, garage
owners were prohibited from conducting ex parte sales of auto-
mobiles which were permitted under the state's Lien Law. 277 To
reach this determination, the court reasoned that there was state
action, thus entitling the automobile owners to due process, be-
cause the state was "so entwined... into the debtor-creditor re-
lationship as to constitute sufficient and meaningful State partici-
pation which triggers the protections afforded by our
Constitution.", 278 In 55 Avenue C Housing Development Fund
Corp., the court agreed with the reasoning of Sharrock and simi-
larly concluded that there was significant state involvement so as
to constitute state action.
the fourteenth amendment only prohibits instances of state discrimination. Id.
(comparing § 6 of article I of the New York State Constitution with the
fourteenth amendment of the Federal Constitution).
277. Id. at 166-67, 379 N.E.2d at 1178-79, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 48-49; see
Act of Mar. 12, 1968, ch. 30, § 3, 1968 N.Y. Laws 68, 69-70 (McKinney);
Act of May 9, 1969, ch. 407, § 63, 1969 N.Y. Laws 68, 596, 621
(McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. LmN LAW §§ 201, 202, 204
(McKinney Supp. 1992)).
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